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Abstract Agudat Yisrael and the religious Zionist movement (Mizrachi) were the two largest
and most influential political organizations of Orthodox Jewry during the first half of the
twentieth century. Competing for the support of observant Jews, the two movements were
enmeshed in bitter ideological and political struggles. Nevertheless, due to the dire situation
of European and Palestine Jewries their political representatives met during the late 1930s in
Paris and London in order to negotiate possible avenues of cooperation. While these endeav-
ors were unprecedented in the history of the two movements, they eventually failed. Due to
their failure, earlier scholarship has dismissed these efforts as a “lost opportunity” for Ortho-
dox Judaism and blamed Agudists for their unwillingness to overcome long-standing rivalries
and ideological reservations. This article, in contrast, perceives the negotiations of 1938–1939
as an important window into intra-Orthodox dynamics during the first half of the twentieth
century. Rather than stressing the difficulties of overcoming ideological barriers and the fail-
ures of non-Zionist Orthodoxy to adapt to the challenges of the modern age, the article argues
that it was a careful weighing of political gains and risks on both sides that dominated the
negotiations and determined their outcome. The insights gained from this close analysis of
intra-Orthodox relations are of significance beyond the question of party politics, as the two
rivals were not only influential political movements, but ultimately came to shape the social,
cultural, and political realities of traditionalist Jewry in the State of Israel during its early years
and well beyond.
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On April 4, 1938, a small group of Orthodox Jews from Europe and Pales-
tine gathered at the Ambassador Hotel in the 9th arrondissement of Paris,
a large and luxurious accommodation that regularly hosted affluent tourists
from around the world. For the eight bearded men with traditional Jewish
yarmulkes on their heads, the venue had the benefit of proximity to the Great
Synagogue of Paris, where they could say their daily prayers. In contrast to
many of the hotel’s other guests, the men assembled were not in Paris to see
the sights. Jacob Rosenheim, Moshe Blau, Yitzhak Breuer, Shlomo Ehrman,
Meir Berlin, Ze’ev Gold, Shmuel Brodt, and Zalman Shragai were repre-
sentatives of the two largest and most influential Orthodox movements, the
non-Zionist Agudat Yisrael (Agudah) and the religious Zionist Mizrachi, and
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their gathering constituted a minor sensation within the world of traditional
Jewry. Since the early years of these two movements, their spokesmen had
engaged in harsh and seemingly relentless ideological and political competi-
tion. The assembly in Paris was the first meeting of their top-ranking leaders
in a long time.
Following two days of intense negotiation, the men reached a noteworthy
agreement to cooperate on several urgent issues: improving the economic
situation of Orthodox educational institutions in East Central Europe, coun-
tering advancing secularization, strengthening religious settlements in Pales-
tine, and working to safeguard religious tenets and institutions within the
emerging Jewish political frameworks under the British Mandate. The scale
of the meeting and the consent of leading politicians to participate in these
joint campaigns were unprecedented in the history of the two movements,
and the results of the Paris summit were lauded as a major breakthrough on
the way to mutual recognition and rapprochement. Many Orthodox activists
deemed the Paris accords a major success for religious Jewry and hoped that
they would inspire further-reaching arrangements in the future.1
This momentous 1938 meeting between Orthodox Jewish politicians took
place against the backdrop of severe geopolitical change. Throughout the
1930s, Jews across East and Central Europe had been under strong economic
pressure and were politically and socially ostracized. Anti-Jewish legisla-
tion and violence shaped not only the lives of German Jews under the ris-
ing Nazi regime, but also afflicted Europe’s largest Jewish community in the
neighboring Polish state. In Palestine, too, living conditions had worsened
considerably since the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in 1936. Yet despite the
seeming success of the Paris summit and the increasingly grave situation of
European Jewry, particularly in light of world events that unfolded over the
months ahead, the great hopes that activists and politicians had pinned on
the meeting and its outcome were soon shattered. The Mizrachi presidium
quickly ratified the agreement, and several internationally renowned rabbinic
authorities expressed their willingness to back such cooperation. Agudah’s
rabbinic council, however, offered resistance. Following months of diplo-
matic efforts, in February 1939 political leaders from both sides met again,
this time in London, to draft an alternative agreement with a more limited fo-
cus that pertained mostly to joint fundraising activities. There was, however,
1For a summary of the meeting and its results, see Protokol mi-ha-Yeshivah ha-Meshutefet
bein ha-Agudah ve-ha-Mizrahi be-Yom 4.4.1938 be-Malon Ambasador be-Paris, in Archives
for the Research of Religious Zionism (henceforth: ARRZ) 001-495. For details regarding the
negotiation process, see “Din ve-Heshbon ha-Merkaz ha-’Olami shel ha-Mizrah. i le-Ve‘idah
ha-’Olamit ha-15’ be-Genevah,” August 6–13, 1939, 80 in ARRZ 006-36. The methodological
challenges of these sources are discussed in the body of the article.
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strong opposition, this time mainly on the side of Mizrachi, and this endeavor
ultimately failed, as well.
Scholarship to date has largely cast the failure of these accords as the prod-
uct of disunity among Agudah leaders and their unwillingness to overcome
long-standing rivalries and ideological reservations. Mizrachists, according
to this narrative, repeatedly attempted to initiate cooperation but their over-
tures were rejected time and again by their non-Zionist counterparts, who
were slow to adapt to changing geopolitical and social realities. “The Paris
conference at the Ambassador Hotel,” wrote Monty Penkower in a pioneering
article on Agudah-Mizrachi negotiations, “represented a lost opportunity to
forge a modus vivendi for the Orthodox cause in Israel and in the Diaspora.
In the time of their people’s unprecedented anguish, Agudah finally could
not transcend longstanding differences with Mizrachi, riveted in the bitter
clash of ideology and personality, a Kulturkampf for Jewry’s future soul.”2
Commenting on the same negotiations in his work on Agudat Yisrael and the
Zionist movement, Yosef Fund took a similar line when faulting Agudists for
their “difficulties to get attuned to the idea of working together with an ideo-
logical rival.”3 These positions fit with a broad tendency among researchers
to accuse non-Zionist Orthodoxy of intellectual stagnation and political pas-
sivity vis-à-vis the radical challenges that Jewish societies were facing in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By their telling, religious Zion-
ists were the ones who recognized the signs of the times and displayed “a
boldness and sense of historic responsibility that Orthodoxy was trying to
evade.”4
To be sure, the inability of Orthodox leaders to cooperate during such dif-
ficult years is disconcerting even without taking into consideration the out-
break of World War II and the destruction of European Jewry in the Holocaust
2Monty Penkower, “A Lost Opportunity: Pre-World War II Efforts Towards Mizrachi–Agudas
Israel Cooperation,” Journal of Israeli History 17, no. 2 (1996): 246.
3Fund does not see the negotiations “as a complete failure.” In his opinion, they constituted
Agudah’s first step toward political convergence with Mizrachi. Yosef Fund, Perud o Hishtat-
fut: Agudat Yisra’el mul ha-Z. iyonut u-Medinat Yisra’el (Jerusalem, 1999), 201f. In a similar
vein, Zev Bauer points to the difficulties of Agudah in adjusting its ideology to changing
geopolitical frameworks. He also lists the power struggles between different national Agu-
dah branches as reason for the failure of the agreements. See his “Ha-Yah. asim ha-Penimiim
be-Yahadut ha-Datit likrat Hakamat Medinat Yisra’el u-ve-’Ikvoteiha, ve-Khinun he-H. asit
ha-Datit ha-Me’uh. edet” (PhD diss., The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2011, 104). All
translations are the author’s, unless otherwise indicated.
4For an important critique of this depiction of traditionalist Jewry, see Glenn Dynner, “Jewish
Traditionalism in Eastern Europe: The Historiographical Gadfly,” Polin 29 (2017): 285–99.
Among others, he cites the lines quoted above, which Ehud Luz phrased in his work on re-
ligion and nationalism in the early Zionist movement. See ibid., 294; Ehud Luz, Parallels
Meet: Religion and Nationalism in the Early Zionist Movement (1882–1904), trans. Lenn J.
Schramm (Philadelphia, 1988), 226.
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only shortly thereafter. But focusing on the causes and culprits of failure ob-
scures other important aspects of these negotiations. Religious Zionists and
Agudists were not only ideological opponents but also competed for social
and political power and influence in Jewish communities throughout Europe
and Palestine. In the 1920s and 1930s, most contact between the two move-
ments took place on the level of mutual attacks in the parties’ media, with
their representatives seldom engaging in face-to-face discussion.5 The nego-
tiations of 1938 and 1939 constitute a unique window into Agudah-Mizrachi
interaction, and close examination of the way they unfolded uncovers an in-
tricate web of mutual relations and differing political interests, thus painting
a more nuanced picture of intra-Orthodox dynamics. Rather than focusing on
the difficulties the movements faced when attempting to overcome ideolog-
ical barriers, and the failures of non-Zionist Orthodoxy to adapt to the chal-
lenges of the modern era, this article argues that a careful weighing of politi-
cal gains and risks on both sides dominated the negotiations and determined
their outcome. The insights gained from this close analysis of intra-Orthodox
relations are of significance beyond the question of party politics, as the two
rivals were not only influential political movements, but ultimately came to
shape the social, cultural, and political realities of traditionalist Jewry in the
State of Israel during its early years and well beyond. After briefly review-
ing the emergence of the two movements, I give a detailed reconstruction of
the negotiation process and then examine the dynamics leading to both the
original agreements and their eventual collapse.
Orthodox Relations during the First Decades of the Twentieth Century
Both Agudat Yisrael and Mizrachi emerged during the first decades of the
twentieth century. In Vilna, a hotspot of Jewish political activism in the Rus-
sian Empire, several activists founded the religious Zionist party Mizrachi
5One of the few exceptions was the debate concerning a joint Orthodox World Congress in
1933-1934, but no meeting of high-ranking representatives comparable to that in Paris took
place during this period. Local Polish leaders met within Jewish communal structures (ke-
hillot) on a regular basis. For details of the debates of 1933–1934, as well as those within the
Polish kehillot, see Daniel Mahla, Orthodox Judaism and the Politics of Religion: From Pre-
war Europe to the State of Israel (New York, 2020). The relative openness to cooperation of
the workers’ parties of the two movements is also worthy of note. Poalei Agudat Yisrael (PAY)
and Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrachi reached an agreement to establish a joint trade union in 1936, which
was ultimately rejected by Agudah’s rabbinic council. For details, see Yosef Avneri, “‘Heskem
she-lo Butza’: Te’ud ha-Masa u-Matan bein ha-Po’el ha-Mizrah. i le-Po’alei Agudat Yisra’el
be-Shenot ha-Sheloshim al Hakamat Tenu’at Po’alim meshutefet,” in Bi-Shvilei ha-Teh. iyah:
Meh. karim ba-Tziyonut ha-Datit, vol. 2, ed. Mordekhai Eliav (Ramat Gan, 1987), 167–99;
Bauer, Ha-Yah. asim ha-Penimiim, 107–34.
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in 1902. A product of conflicts within the Zionist movement concerning en-
gagement with modern culture, Mizrachi quickly became an important politi-
cal venue for observant activists.6 Ten years later, rabbinic authorities and lay
leaders from Central Europe and the Russian Empire gathered in Kattowitz
in the German Empire to launch Agudat Yisrael. Agudah aimed to unite tra-
ditionalist elites from Europe and Palestine and to provide an alternative to
the political activism of socialist and nationalist parties.7
Within several years of their founding, both Mizrachi and Agudat Yis-
rael had established multiple branches throughout Europe and Palestine. De-
spite the plethora of stakeholders and institutions appealing to traditionalist
Jewry during this period, the two organizations quickly proved themselves
influential players.8 Competing directly for the support of observant Jews,
the two became enmeshed in bitter ideological and political struggles. Their
adherents fought over rabbinic posts, power in local Jewish communities,
and political representation in different countries and on the international
level. While neither group was able to garner the majority of Jewish votes
in such crucial arenas as the Second Polish Republic, Agudah enjoyed far
greater support among the traditionalist masses. What is more, the move-
ment’s Council of Torah Sages included some of the most important religious
authorities of the time. In contrast, Mizrachi could boast far less electoral
success and very little rabbinic support.9 This, however, did not render the
organization insignificant. The strength of religious Zionism lay in the social
and political activism of its adherents and leaders, and in Mizrachi’s orga-
nizational advantages as part of the Zionist Organization (ZO). Especially
among the youth, religious Zionism constituted a significant challenge to tra-
ditionalist understanding of Jewish social organization.10
6For early struggles in the Zionist movement over matters of culture and the founding of
Mizrachi, see Luz, Parallels Meet.
7Regarding the founding of Agudat Yisrael, see Gershon C. Bacon, The Politics of Tradition:
Agudat Yisrael in Poland, 1916–1939 (Jerusalem, 1996), 26–37; and Alan Mittleman, The
Politics of Torah: The Jewish Political Tradition and the Founding of Agudat Israel (Albany,
1996).
8It is important to note that a great variety of Orthodox institutions existed long before
these two movements were founded and continued to flourish and compete with Agudah and
Mizrachi, especially on the local and regional levels. For the political involvement of Orthodox
Jews as early as the mid-nineteenth century, see, for example, Rachel Manekin, The Jews of
Galicia and the Austrian Constitution: The Beginning of Modern Jewish Politics [in Hebrew]
(Jerusalem, 2015).
9Regarding the electoral success of Jewish parties and the Polish chapters of the two Orthodox
rivals, see Bacon, The Politics of Tradition, 207–21; Ezra Mendelsohn, On Modern Jewish
Politics (New York, 1993) 65–73; and Asaf Kaniel, Aspirations and Achievements: Mizrachi
in Interwar Poland [in Hebrew] (Ramat Gan, 2011), 32–49.
10Even Polish authorities, who monitored the political activities of the states’ ethnic and re-
ligious minorities during the interwar period, identified the high fluctuation of adherents and
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Agudists opposed the aims of the ZO and were reluctant to work with
its institutions. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of World War I, the movement
established a local office in Palestine and became increasingly involved in
the affairs of the local Jewish communities. As the situation of East Cen-
tral European Jewry grew more and more dire during the late 1920s and
1930s, Palestine became an increasingly important destination for emigra-
tion, and Agudah’s presence and activities in this arena expanded accord-
ingly. In this context, Agudists came in ever-closer contact with the ZO, and
the two organizations began to discuss possible areas of cooperation, despite
their mutual enmity.11 The gradual rapprochement between Agudah and the
Zionist institutions also impacted intra-Orthodox dynamics and compelled
Orthodox leaders to reconsider their reciprocal relations. While both Agu-
dah and Mizrachi leaders were concerned about the advance of secularism
and worked to safeguard Orthodox lifestyles and frameworks, they were, at
the same time, bitter political adversaries. Agudah’s gradual rapprochement
with Zionist institutions did not, in fact, lead to a convergence of the ap-
proaches and interests of the Orthodox movements, but actually intensified
mutual competition for power and influence.12
With these developments in mind, we can now analyze the negotiations in
Paris and in London during the late 1930s.
Paris and London: Two Agreements, Few Results
The momentous meeting of Mizrachi and Agudah leaders in Paris was ini-
tiated by religious Zionists from Europe, Palestine, and the United States,
who convened in July and August 1937 in Zurich for the fourteenth world
congress of their movement. Congress participants mandated Mizrachi’s
political executive to explore possibilities for Orthodox cooperation.13
Mizrachists had promoted cooperation between the two movements in the
Agudah’s difficulty in preventing its youth from defecting to the youth groups of Mizrachi and
other parties. See, for example, Sprawozdanie (Jan.–Mar. 1935), in Archiwum Akt Nowych
MSW IV/98.
11Regarding the activities of Agudah in Palestine and inner tensions, see Menachem
Friedman, H. evrah va-Dat: Ha-’Ortodoksyah ha-lo-Z. iyonit be-Erez. -Yisra’el, 5678–5696
(Jerusalem, 1977). For negotiations with the ZO, see Fund, Perud o Hishtatfut, 164–77.
12For a detailed analysis of tripartite relations between the two Orthodox movements and
the ZO during the 1920s and 1930s, see Daniel Mahla, “No Trinity: The Tripartite Relations
between Agudat Yisrael, the Mizrahi Movement and the Zionist Organization,” Journal of
Israeli History 34, no. 2 (2015): 117–40.
13Hahlatot ha-Ve‘idah ha-Olamit ha-14’ shel ha-Mizrachi be-Z. irikh, July 28–August 3, 1937,
in ARRZ 006-36.
FAILURE THAT MATTERS 493
past, but this time things seemed more promising. In 1935, Mizrachists had
entered a historical alliance with the Labor Zionist movement, a decision
that ended a period of harsh inner-party struggles concerning the ideological
and organizational orientation of the party. At the same time, the situation
of religious Jewry in Eastern Europe and Palestine further deteriorated, and
Orthodox leaders from both parties were alarmed when, in the context of
British efforts to stabilize the tumultuous situation in Palestine, the founda-
tion of a Jewish state seemed suddenly within reach. Against this backdrop,
attempts to work together to strengthen religious institutions and life in Eu-
rope, as well as in the Jewish settlements in Palestine, seemed to gain more
traction. Taking up the delegates’ mandate, the secretary of the international
Mizrachi, Meir Berlin, approached the president of Agudat Yisrael, Jacob
Rosenheim, shortly after the congress and proposed a meeting between high-
ranking politicians of both movements.14 Rosenheim, who had himself been
at the forefront of previous attempts to foster intra-Orthodox cooperation,
welcomed the initiative and delivered Berlin’s blessings to the third Agudah
World Congress in Marienbad (today’s Mariánské Lázně) just two weeks
later. The participants of this meeting applauded Berlin’s overture and ap-
proved Mizrachi’s request.15 Their spontaneous consent seemed to indicate
a new willingness for rapprochement. Agudah leaders contended with strong
criticism during these years for not having done enough for religious set-
tlements in Palestine, and Mizrachi’s initiative may have been a welcome
opportunity to demonstrate their awareness of just how critical this issue was
to the Jewish masses in Europe. Subsequent follow-up strengthened the im-
pression that both sides were indeed interested in rapprochement. Old resent-
ments and mistrust resurfaced in debates over an appropriate meeting-place,
but after some to and fro, both sides eventually agreed to convene on April 4
and 5, 1938, in the Ambassador Hotel in Paris.
In Paris itself, the atmosphere among representatives was friendly. Over
the course of two intense days, participants considered how they might work
together for the good of Orthodox Jews in both Europe and Palestine. The
protocols of these discussions, preserved in the Archives for the Research
14Meir Berlin to Jacob Rosenheim, August 17, 1937, reprinted in Din ve-Heshbon ha-Merkaz
ha-’Olami shel ha-Mizrah. i le-Ve’idah ha-’Olamit ha-15’ be-Genevah, 6.8.-13.8.1939, 63f,
in ibid., 006-36. Meir Berlin (1880–1949), who later changed his name to Bar-Ilan, came
from a distinguished rabbinic family in Volozhin (today’s Belarus). He was active in Mizrachi
from the first days of the movement. Berlin spent World War I in the U.S. and immigrated to
Palestine in 1926. He held numerous offices in Mizrachi and the Zionist Organization. Jacob
Rosenheim (1870–1965) from Frankfurt wrote extensively on political topics and published
the Orthodox newspaper Der Israelit. He was among the most important founding figures of
Agudat Yisrael, and later became the movement’s president.
15As Jacob Rosenheim reported to Meir Berlin in his answer, see ibid., 64.
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of Religious Zionism at Bar Ilan University, suggest that both sides demon-
strated empathy and goodwill, but that disagreement and friction remained.
Mizrachi leaders emphasized that their meeting would resonate positively
with the Jewish masses. Agudists, by contrast, tried to trim back expectations,
and stressed the confidential and limited character of the meeting.16 The
reported wariness of Agudah’s politicians reflected the movement’s modus
operandi: its leaders generally preferred to act behind the scenes. Mizrachi,
on the other hand, tended to advertise their political activities widely in order
to attract adherents. Yet, in this context, it is worth noting that the reconstruc-
tion of the Paris meeting, as well as of intra-Orthodox dynamics more gen-
erally, both relied heavily on Mizrachi sources, who created and preserved
many more archival materials than their Agudah counterparts. Historians
would be wise to take this imbalance into consideration, as it implies that
our impression of events is filtered largely through a religious Zionist lens.17
Notwithstanding such differences and despite a number of unresolved is-
sues, the participants eventually reached agreement on several issues: both
sides approved a meeting in Vilna of the rashei yeshivah, or deans of East-
ern European yeshivot, to discuss ways to improve the economic situation of
those institutions. In addition, leaders of both parties declared their intention
to launch a joint campaign to foster the observance of Jewish law among the
masses and to combat processes of secularization; Mizrachi and Agudah rep-
resentatives agreed to coordinate their efforts to ensure religious rights in the
anticipated Jewish state; the eight participants in the Paris summit announced
that their movements would henceforth insist on joint appearances at meet-
ings with the ZO and at hearings before the British authorities regarding their
demands of a future state; and, finally, they arranged to work together to sup-
port religious settlements in Palestine. The leaders committed to organizing
joint committees to work out the details of these agreements and undertook
that both sides would submit the accords to their highest party councils for
ratification.18
16Protokol mi-ha-Yeshivah ha-Meshutefet bein ha-Agudah ve-ha-Mizrahi be-Yom 4.4.1938
be-Malon Ambasador be-Paris, in ibid., 001-495. The protocol is reprinted together with
additional documents in “Nisayon she-lo ala Yafe,” in Sefer ha-Z. iyonut ha-Datit: Iyunim,
Ma’amarim, Reshimot, Te‘udot, ed. Yitzhak Rapha’el and Zalman Shragai (Jerusalem, 1977),
517–29.
17This imbalance is exacerbated by the fact that the two most important Mizrachi archives are
freely accessible, whereas access to much of the Agudah material, currently located in party
headquarters in Jerusalem, is granted very selectively. This restricted access is only partially
counterbalanced by the archives of the movement’s US branch in New York City, which are
open to the public.
18Protokol mi-ha-Yeshivah ha-Meshutefet bein ha-Agudah ve-ha-Mizrachi be-Yom 4.4.1938
be-Malon Ambasador be-Paris, in ARRZ. 001-495.
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In the aftermath of the Paris conference, Mizrachi and Agudah represen-
tatives informed their adherents of the meeting’s resolutions and announced
them in their respective party presses. Mizrachi newspapers struck an en-
thusiastic tone, celebrating the agreement as a great success for Orthodox
Jewry, in general, and for their movement, in particular.19 “Could anyone
be so blind,” Meir Berlin asked rhetorically in an interview with the Pol-
ish Mizrachi organ, Di Yudishe Shtime, “not to see the great success that
national-religious Jewry attained through this agreement?”20 Agudist press
organs also reported on the meeting, yet their coverage was very different
in spirit. Careful not to stir premature hopes, Agudah newspapers informed
their readers of the developments in a mostly matter-of-fact tone and made
sure to stress that the accords still awaited the ratification of their move-
ment’s rabbinic council.21 One of the first articles to appear in Agudah’s
organ in Palestine, Kol Yisrael, deemed it necessary to notify its readers that
the party leadership wished to correct some inaccurate impressions conveyed
by “non-Agudist” (read, Mizrachi) newspapers. The agreement most likely
to be implemented, its author held, was a united religious front, if and when
a Jewish state was established.22
In the meantime, the diplomatic process stagnated. As soon as details
of the agreement became known, the deans of the great Eastern Euro-
pean yeshivot publicly rejected any cooperation for the benefit of their
institutions—to avoid, they claimed, the interference of political parties.
Mizrachi’s presidium ratified the agreement quickly, but it soon became clear
that it would be far more difficult to obtain the official approval of Agu-
dah’s Council of Torah Sages.23 The renowned rabbi of Vilna, Chaim Ozer
Grodzenski, himself a member of the council, supported the agreement and
19See, for example, the Polish Di Yudishe Shtime, April 15, 1938, 2; April 29, 1938, 2f; May 6,
1938, 2; May 13, 1938, 2. Ha-Z. ofeh in Palestine reported similarly: Ha-Z. ofeh, April 7, 1938,
1; April 13, 1938, 1; May 5, 1938, 2f; May 5, 1938, 3; April 21, 1938, 1.
20Di Yudishe Shtime, May 20, 1938, 5.
21The only exception to this was the media representing Agudah’s labor wing, which hailed
the conference as a great victory for observant workers (Ha-Yesod, April 10, 1938, 3). The
article was by one of the leaders of the Agudah’s workers’ movement, PAY, Benjamin Mintz.
Though hailing the agreement as an important beginning, he demanded that leaders of both
sides take further steps to deepen cooperation. He also strongly criticized the Agudah leader-
ship. The Polish Mizrachi newspaper Di Yudishe Shtime reprinted his article about a month
later in Yiddish (Di Yudishe Shtime, May 6, 1938, 5). For the frictions and disagreements
between the Agudah mother movement and its workers’ wing, see Bacon, The Politics of Tra-
dition, 101–15.
22Kol Yisrael, April 28, 1938, 4; May 19, 1938, 3. See also the Polish newspaper Dos Yudishe
Togblat, April 7, 1938, 2; April 20, 1938, 2, and the German Der Israelit, April 7, 1938, 2.
23World Mizrachi Office to Executive of Agudat Yisrael, April 26, 1938, in Archives of Reli-
gious Zionism (henceforth: ARZ), MO143.
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went to great lengths to convince his colleagues.24 Rosenheim remained in
close contact with Mizrachi leaders and repeatedly assured them that he and
Grodzenski were working hard to ensure that the agreed cooperation would
move forward. His tone, however, was increasingly pessimistic. Polish Agud-
ists, he informed his Mizrachi partners in May, had urged their leadership to
avoid any steps conveying the impression that the two movements would en-
ter a political federation. All sides had to make it perfectly clear that this was
nothing but a onetime cooperation. Echoing an earlier criticism voiced by
his Polish colleague, Isaac Meir Levin,25 Rosenheim bemoaned Mizrachi’s
enthusiastic media coverage.
“The publication of the Paris agreement,” he wrote, “has stirred hopes in
a completely unnecessary manner; hopes that were objectively not justified.
[. . . ] You might recall,” he continued, “that I have been opposed to their
publication from the beginning, and I feel sorry that I yielded in this point to
my own friends, as well as to yours.”26
In the following weeks, the process seemed to stagnate. Months later,
Mizrachi leaders still bemoaned the lack of a decision by Agudah’s rab-
binic council. As it turned out, although several council members supported
the agreement, it was impossible to attain approval from everyone.27 In an
attempt to break the deadlock, some political representatives started to ex-
plore alternative options. In November 1938, the leader of Mizrachi’s work-
ers movement in Palestine, Zalman Shragai, returned to Paris to meet with
Solomon Ehrmann from Agudat Yisrael.28 Together, the two men considered
24Chaim Ozer Grodzenski (1863–1940) was one of the dominant decisors and spiritual author-
ities of his generation. He moved to Vilna in 1883 and was recognized as the city’s eminent
rabbinical authority two years later. After the death of Rabbi Isaac Elhanan Spector in 1896,
he was recognized as the undisputed rabbinical leader of European Jewry.
25Isaac Meir Levin (1893–1971), son-in-law of the Gerer Rebbe, was the preeminent political
leader of Agudat Yisrael in interwar Poland. He immigrated to Palestine in 1940, where he
became the head of the local Agudah branch.
26Jacob Rosenheim to Zalman Shragai, May 22, 1938, in ibid., MO140. With “my own
friends,” Rosenheim was probably referring to Isaac Breuer, a great proponent of coopera-
tion between the two sides and an important leader of PAY.
27The two major opponents of any cooperation with religious Zionists were the influential
Gerer Rebbe, Rabbi Abraham Mordechai Alter, and the spiritual authority of the Old Yishuv
in Jerusalem, Rabbi Joseph Zvi Dushinski. Although they were in the minority, these two
rabbis were weighty authorities, who could simply not be outvoted. Jacob Rosenheim’s letter
to Meir Berlin on these developments is reprinted in Din ve-Heshbon ha-Merkaz ha-Olami
shel ha-Mizrahi le-Ve‘idah ha-Olamit ha-15’ be-Genevah, 6.8.–13.8.1939, 75 in ARRZ 006-
36.
28Shlomo Zalman Shragai (1899–1995) was one of the central leaders of the religious Zionist
workers’ movement, Ha-Poel Ha-Mizrachi. Shlomo Ehrman (1885–1965) was a member of
international Agudah’s leadership from the time of the organization’s establishment in 1912.
Together with Yitzhak Breuer, he founded his movement’s Palestine office in 1918.
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forms of cooperation that could “be arranged without more ado, and without
the final ratification of our Paris agreements,” such as supporting emigrants
from Nazi Germany. Shragai and Ehrmann suggested limiting joint activi-
ties to Western Europe and the US, thus excluding the very centers of the
movements’ political struggle—Poland and Palestine.29
While the efforts of these two men produced no actual results, others were
more successful. In January 1939, Moses Blau, the eminent Agudah leader
from the traditionalist settlement in Jerusalem, advanced the idea of a joint
fundraising campaign in England and other Western European countries.30
Like Ehrmann and Shragai, Blau hoped to avoid contention by focusing on
countries in which the ideological struggle between the two Orthodox move-
ments was less intense. He suggested dividing the collected funds evenly,
so that each side could distribute its shares independently. During a visit to
London, Blau presented his proposal to Meir Berlin, and both parties con-
sidered the idea.31 In a reversal of prior positions, Blau’s suggestion met
with consent among Agudah leaders, while most religious Zionists were op-
posed. Ultimately, Mizrachi’s executive in Jerusalem rejected the proposal.
Disappointed, Blau threatened to run the fundraising campaign without the
involvement of religious Zionists. At this point, Berlin asserted his prestige
and power as the central leader of Mizrachi, and signed the London accords
together with Jacob Rosenheim—despite a formal rejection from his col-
leagues in Jerusalem.32
In the accords, signed on February 21, 1939, the two sides agreed to
launch joint fundraising campaigns in several Western European countries.
The resulting revenues were to be divided equally, and transferred to the par-
ties’ respective Palestine funds—Mizrachi’s Keren Erez. Yisrael and Agudat
Yisrael’s Keren Ha-Yishuv. The two groups would fundraise in England, Hol-
land, France, Belgium, and Switzerland “with the consent of local territorial
organizations.” Neither of the two sides was to fundraise independently for
its institutions in Palestine until the campaign, scheduled for the end of the
Jewish year 5698 in September 1939, came to a close.33
Leaders of Agudah and Mizrachi met in London on March 8 to kick off
the campaign. Representatives of their world movements, as well as members
29Solomon Ehrmann to Meir Berlin and Jacob Rosenheim, November 30, 1938, in ARZ
MO155.
30Moses Uri Blau (1885–1946) was born in the traditionalist settlements in Jerusalem. He
came to represent the conservative circles of the Old Yishuv, edited the local Agudah’s mouth-
piece Kol Yisrael, and became one of the movement’s preeminent leaders.
31Jacob Rosenheim to Meir Berlin, January 22, 1939, in ibid., MO151.
32See Bauer, Ha-Yah. asim ha-Penimiim, 96.
33Agreement between the Agudat Yisrael World Organization and the Mizrachi World Orga-
nization, February 21, 1939, cited in its English translation in ARZ MO155.
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of their English branches, arranged the details for joint fundraising in Eng-
land, where the campaign got off to a good start. In other countries, however,
the picture did not look as bright. Only a few days after the meeting in Lon-
don, Agudah branches in Switzerland, Holland, and Belgium announced their
refusal to fundraise with their Mizrachi colleagues. Despite these setbacks,
Rosenheim and Blau were determined to carry through the agreement, at least
in England. Yet in London, too, the situation soon deteriorated. The nomina-
tion of treasurers elicited struggles, as English Mizrachists were unwilling to
accept the Agudah candidate for treasurer—the movement’s British leader,
Harry Goodman.34 Tense letter exchanges between Rosenheim and Berlin
followed, but despite several attempts by the former to resolve the situation,
they were unable to reach compromise. Finally, during the last days of June
1939, Rosenheim informed Berlin that Agudah’s Council of Torah Sages had
voted against ratifying the Paris agreements. In response, Mizrachi represen-
tatives canceled the joint fundraising arrangements. The efforts of the two
Orthodox movements to join forces had reached a dead end.35
The Dynamics of Political Competition
The negotiations between Mizrachi and Agudah leaders in Paris and Lon-
don raise a number of questions regarding the political dynamics involved.
What precipitated these meetings between high-ranking representatives of
both movements after decades of animosity devoid of similar encounters?
Many of the calls for cooperation and mutual rapprochement during 1938 and
1939 highlighted the urgency of easing the economic and religious plight of
the Jewish masses. But the dire situation of Jews in Europe and Palestine dur-
ing the late 1930s is not enough to explain the timing of the negotiations. The
unprecedented destruction and ineffable suffering that the Jews of Europe
and Palestine experienced during World War I had not generated compara-
ble attempts at cooperation.36 What is more, among Agudah and Mizrachi in
34Harry Aron Goodman (1899–1961) was a British businessman and Agudah leader from
London. Inter alia, he edited the British party’s Jewish Weekly and was the president of Adath
Yisroel Congregation.
35Much of the correspondence between Rosenheim and Berlin can be found in ARZ MO 155.
This file also contains the Summary of Correspondence and Relevant Documents in connection
with the proposed Mizrahi-Agudah Agreement, Mizrahi Federation of Gt. Britain and Ireland,
July 1939. Regarding the rabbinic council’s rejection of the proposal, see Jacob Rosenheim to
Meir Berlin, May 28, 1939, in ibid., MO 155. For a report about Mizrachi’s cancellation of
the London treaty, see Betzalel Bidziński to Mizrachi Swiss, June 13, 1937, in ibid., MO161.
36While individual leaders had met in the aftermath of the war, their discussions had not
reached a similar intensity, nor did they achieve any tangible results. For a depiction of
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Poland and Palestine—the areas most urgently in need of help—were some
of the strongest opponents of cooperation. The London agreements, as we
have seen, aimed specifically to exclude these branches from any active in-
volvement in cooperative endeavors.
To gain better understanding of why Mizrachi and Agudah leaders were
willing to enter into negotiations during these years, we must consider their
mutual dynamics and questions of ideological and organizational develop-
ment. Political competition was indeed harsh and often relentless, in par-
ticular in Poland and Palestine. In the Second Polish Republic, representa-
tives of the two movements competed within the same communal structures
(kehillot) and fought directly for power and influence, as well as for jobs
for their adherents. In Palestine, such forms of competition were less pro-
nounced, as Agudah had its strongholds in the traditionalist communities of
the Old Yishuv, and Mizrachi dominated religious councils in the Zionist
New Yishuv. Nevertheless, the Old and New yishuvim were not completely
separate spheres, and during the 1920s and 1930s they became increasingly
intertwined. Furthermore, as the public sector developed under the British
Mandate and emerging Zionist institutions fulfilled many of the functions of
a modern state, the question of relations between religion and state gained
urgency.
Religious life and institutions in Palestine deteriorated over the course
of the 1930s due to the steady influx of largely secular immigrants.37 When
the British began to consider the partition of Palestine to stabilize the increas-
ingly tense and violent situation that followed the Arab revolt of 1936, Ortho-
dox leaders were on high alert. They fiercely debated appropriate responses
to unfolding events, as well as the outlook and constitution of a future Jewish
state. The role of Judaism in what would clearly be a largely secular state was
a major concern of Orthodox representatives across the spectrum.38 All sides
agreed on the need to safeguard basic Orthodox institutions and frameworks
vis-à-vis the secular authorities of such a state, but that is where their agree-
ment ended. The two movements promoted distinct and often contradictory
Mizrachi–Agudah relations during these years, see Yosef Elih. ai, “Ha-Imut bein ‘ha-Mizrah. i’
le-vein Agudat Yisra’el be-Polin be-Shanim 1917–1920,” Sefer Shragai. Perakim be-H. eker
ha-Z. iyonut ha-Datit ve-ha-‘Aliyah le-’Erez. Yisra’el, ed. Mordekhai Eli’av and Yitzhak Rafa’el
(Jerusalem, 1981), 96–117.
37For example, complaints from all the Jewish settlements in Palestine to central Mizrachi
leaders in Jerusalem about the public violation of the Sabbath increased significantly during
the second half of the 1930s. For a selection of such letters, see CZA S51/193.
38Despite their general opposition to a Jewish state, in the late 1930s Agudah leaders even
drafted their own version of a constitution in the hope of securing Orthodox rights. The draft
proposals by Moses Blau and Yitzhak Breuer were republished in Isaac Lewin, Material for
the Preparation of a Constitution for the Jewish State: On a Religious Basis [in Hebrew] (New
York, 1948).
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approaches to the role of religion in a future state, and rivalries within the
tripartite structure of the ZO turned their representatives into bitter adver-
saries.39
In the first decades of their existence, both movements were preoccupied
with the consolidation of their respective organizations. From the founding
of Agudat Yisrael in 1912 until its first World Congress in 1923, ideological
and organizational boundaries were largely in flux. Both sides struggled to
define their own essence as well as mutual boundaries. Any discussion of co-
operation immediately raised hopes, on both sides, that one movement might
succeed in drawing the other closer, and a merger seemed a realistic option,
at least to some. This changed in the early 1920s, as Agudists consolidated
their movement’s organizational outlook and political alignment. In the pe-
riod thereafter, communication between the organizations consisted mainly
of mutual attacks and polemics in the press. During the 1930s, in response to
the deteriorating situations in Europe and Palestine, leaders of both groups re-
considered the possibility of cooperation. Yet these contacts were already of
very different character than the negotiations of earlier decades. By this point,
both movements had refined their approaches and were organizationally de-
fined, and it had become increasingly clear to leaders of both groups that
neither would be able to gain political hegemony over all segments of Jewish
Orthodoxy. When Mizrachi and Agudah leaders met in Paris and London, no
one expressed serious hopes for a merger. At the meeting in the Ambassador
Hotel, Polish Mizrachi leader Samuel Brodt openly addressed the irreconcil-
able positions of the two movements, and urged both sides to work together
lest they tear each other apart.40 Above all else, it was the clear differenti-
ation of the two Orthodox movements that allowed the leaders of Agudah
and Mizrachi to reconsider political cooperation in the spring of 1938. At
the same time, both sides continued to display deep ambivalence about such
endeavors, and carefully weighed the political risks and gains of every move.
Yeshiva Funding and the Differing Positions vis-à-vis the Paris Accords
Among the various avenues of cooperation that Agudah and Mizrachi lead-
ers explored at their meeting in Paris, one of the most urgent and, at the
39In fact, neither the Mizrachi nor Agudah leaderships were true to their declared commitment
that they would not appear separately at discussions with the ZO or at hearings before the
British authorities, even before it became clear that Agudah’s rabbinic council would not ratify
the agreement. For further details, see Mahla, “No Trinity.”
40Protokol mi-ha-Yeshivah ha-Meshutefet bein ha-Agudah ve-ha-Mizrahi be-Yom 4.4.1938
be-Malon Ambasador be-Paris, in ibid., 001-495.
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same time, most sensitive was improving the economic situation of yeshivot
in East Central Europe. These institutions were novel frameworks developed
during the nineteenth century. In contrast to earlier yeshivot, they were in-
dependent of local communities and drew students from all over Europe.
The heads of these prestigious institutions were charismatic leaders, often ac-
knowledged as central religious authorities within the wider Jewish world.41
As these yeshivot were training the future religious elite, both Agudists and
Mizrachists attached great importance to the issue. The debates following
the meeting in Paris highlighted many of the central contentions between the
two movements, thereby shedding more light on the overall dynamics of the
negotiations.
All the participants at the meeting in Paris agreed that the yeshivot were in
dire need of financial support. Mizrachi representatives urged attendees to act
immediately and undertake concerted fundraising efforts. Jacob Rosenheim
and Moses Blau were reluctant, however, and insisted that no decision be
taken without consulting the yeshiva deans. Rosenheim called into question
whether the deans would agree to take part in such an endeavor, as they gen-
erally resisted any dependence on political parties. Blau warned against pub-
lishing any resolution on the topic before consulting the deans themselves.
But Meir Berlin brushed aside such concerns and argued that Mizrachi and
Agudah should enter a federation for the advancement of Torah studies re-
gardless of the attitude of the deans. Support for such endeavors, he claimed,
might be rejected by the administration of the yeshivot, “but the religious
masses have both the will and the faith in this possibility.”42
As Agudah politicians cautioned, the Eastern European yeshiva deans
were indeed wary of any interference in their institutions. Nonetheless,
their attitude towards the two movements differed substantially. Some were
themselves members of Agudah’s rabbinic council, and others were sympa-
thetic to the movement’s activities. Most, however, were deeply opposed to
Mizrachi. Even Chaim Ozer Grodzenski, who widely advocated for a gen-
eral agreement with religious Zionists, strictly resisted cooperation on this
plane.43 With his colleague Israel Meir Kagan (better known by his pen
name Chafetz Chaim), Grodzenski had founded a Yeshiva Council (Va’ad
41See, inter alia, Immanuel Etkes, ed., Yeshivot u-vate midrashot (Jerusalem, 2006); Shaul
Stampfer, Lithuanian Yeshivas of the Nineteenth Century: Creating a Tradition of Learning
(Oxford, 2012). On the financial straits of the yeshivot in the interwar period and various
stratagems to deal with them, see Ben-Tsiyon Klibansky, The Golden Age of the Lithuanian
Yeshivot in Eastern Europe [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem, 2014), 214–88.
42Protokol mi-ha-Yeshivah ha-Meshutefet bein ha-Agudah ve-ha-Mizrahi be-Yom 4.4.1938
be-Malon Ambasador be-Paris, in ARRZ 001-495.
43See his letter to the Agudah Executive from 1938, in Iggerot R’ Hayim Ozer, Kovez. Iggerotav
shel Maran Rashkahbah, vol. 2 (Bnei Brak, 1999), 349f.
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Ha-Yeshivot) in 1924 in order to preserve Eastern European institutions, thus
his resistance to joint fundraising highlights the sensitive nature of this is-
sue.44 The fact that these institutions were independent of communal struc-
tures endowed their deans with great authority and power. Agudists embraced
the elevated status of the religious elite, while Mizrachists strongly objected
to such trends. By stressing the concept of the “will of the masses,” Berlin
indirectly challenged the deans’ authority, reflecting his movement’s broader
approach to such matters.
The deans’ concerns certainly had some substance. A widely publicized
and celebrated agreement between two parties did, indeed, run the risk
of exacerbating tensions between the organizations regarding their use of
funds and thereby subjecting the yeshivot to unwelcome public and politi-
cal scrutiny. Mizrachi and Agudah advocated substantially different educa-
tional approaches, in particular regarding Zionism and the study of secular
knowledge,45 leading even well-meaning Mizrachists to admit in private cor-
respondence that the gaps between their movements on matters of education
were too wide to allow them to work together productively in the pedagog-
ical realm.46 Exacerbating such differences, both sides had for years used
their party presses to harshly attack one another’s educational facilities. In
1927, the Polish Agudah newspaper Der Yud derided Mizrachi’s prominent
rabbinic seminary in Warsaw, Takhkemoni, as a factory that produced “boor-
ish” leaders on assembly lines, devoid of any yiddishkayt.47 A few years later,
the Mizrachi press questioned whether Agudah’s flagship yeshiva in Lublin
had any value beside the grandiosity of its building.48
Mizrachists understood the deans’ resistance to joint fundraising as a re-
jection of their movement, as many of the deans had taken part in Agudah’s
congress in Marienbad the year before. Such suspicions are hard to dismiss
completely. The Vilna region was one of the hotspots of conflict and political
tension between the two parties. As the spiritual center of Eastern European
Jews, the “Jerusalem of Lithuania,” the choice of venue was highly symbolic.
Only a few years earlier, the city had been embroiled in a bitter struggle over
44The organization supported a network of 70 institutions. Much of its organizational work is
documented in YIVO Archives; Records of the Va’ad Ha-Yeshivot (Vilna, Poland); RG 25. On
the founding of the Yeshiva Council, see Klibansky, Golden Age of the Lithuanian Yeshivot,
214–45.
45Many of the important yeshiva heads shared Agudah’s reservations regarding secular stud-
ies, and leaned toward the non-Zionist, traditionalist party in other matters as well.
46See, for example, the letter of the Mizrachist and rabbi from Fulda, Dr. L. Cahn, to the noted
Zionist leader Henrietta Szold, June 25, 1937, in CZA S75/342.
47Der Yud, December 22, 1927, 2.
48Di Yudishe Shtime, February 21, 1935, 3.
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its rabbinate. Rabbi Isaac Rubinstein, an important Mizrachi leader, had of-
fended some of the greatest spiritual authorities worldwide by taking the ti-
tle Chief Rabbi, thus leaving highly accomplished scholars like Chaim Ozer
Grodzenski with mere “adjunct” positions (podrabiny). The conflict had been
formally settled by the time Mizrachi and Agudah representatives proposed
a meeting of rashei yeshivah in the city, with Rubinstein embracing the rep-
resentative and administrational aspects of his position, and Grodzenski as
the accepted spiritual authority. Nevertheless, tensions between the two sides
continued to simmer.49
As it turned out, a few weeks later Polish Mizrachists also condemned the
resolution. Religious Zionist leaders from Poland fiercely reproached their
colleagues for having decided on what they considered to be internal Polish
affairs without consulting them. Isaac Rubinstein, backed by his colleague
Rabbi Isaac Nissenbaum, declared that the Polish Mizrachi would not partic-
ipate in the conference if it took place in Vilna. Anxious about his own po-
sition if an assembly of the great Eastern European rabbinic authorities were
to meet in Vilna, he demanded that the event be relocated to Jerusalem.50
As noted previously, when Mizrachi and Agudah leaders tried to revive the
possibility of cooperation in the months following the collapse of the Paris
accords, they dropped the issue of joint activity on behalf of the Eastern Eu-
ropean yeshivot.
Despite the qualms of Rosenheim and Blau, the two sides eventually
agreed to organize a conference of the yeshiva deans in Vilna,51 but the deans,
as Rosenheim had predicted, rejected it, expressing concerns about the polit-
ical independence of their institutions. The protocols of the Paris convention
do not record every detail of the discussions, and it is hard to reconstruct
exactly how the delegates came to this resolution. Considering the doubts
and concerns raised during the meeting itself and the tensions that the issue
brought to the surface, it is questionable just how seriously the participants
anticipated its ratification. Despite Rubinstein’s refusal to hold the meeting
in Vilna, it is clear that religious Zionists stood to gain considerably on the
political plane. Had the yeshiva deans accepted financial support, they could
hardly have continued to “preach hatred against Mizrachi,”52 as some in the
49For an analysis of this conflict, see Gershon C. Bacon, “Warsaw-Radom-Vilna. Three Dis-
putes over Rabbinical Posts in Interwar Poland and Their Implications for the Change in Jew-
ish Public Discourse,” Jewish History 13, no. 1(1999): 103–26.
50Isaac Nissenbaum to Mizrachi Executive, May 15, 1938, in ARZ MO147. See also Isaac
Nissenbaum to Zeev Gold, June 28, 1938, in ARZ MO162.
51Protokol mi-ha-Yeshivah ha-Meshutefet bein ha-Agudah ve-ha-Mizrachi be-Yom 4.4.1938
be-Malon Ambasador be-Paris, in ARRZ-495.
52As Nissenbaum claimed in his letter to the Mizrachi Executive, see Isaac Nissenbaum to
Mizrachi Executive, May 15, 1938, in ibid., MO147.
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movement insinuated, they were wont to do. Agudah, on the other hand, did
not anticipate similar benefits from such an agreement. While the organiza-
tion’s leaders, who constantly lamented their lack of financial means, might
have gained from Mizrachi’s expertise in fundraising, they were reluctant
to afford Mizrachi political recognition by some of the outstanding spiritual
leaders of the time.
The reason Rosenheim and Blau eventually agreed to include the issue
in the Paris accords is likely connected to abiding concerns about the pub-
lic reputations of the two movements. By the late 1930s, Orthodox leaders
sensed that the Jewish masses expected them to overcome their ideological
quarrels and join forces to address the dire political and economic situation
of European Jewry. In the political framework of the Second Polish Republic,
in particular, where both Agudah and Mizrachi competed with other parties
for votes and support, such concerns could not be taken lightly. This aware-
ness, in fact, governed much of the politics surrounding the Paris and London
accords, as the episodes recounted below will demonstrate.
The Jewish Street and Its Impact on the Negotiations
Several months after the first contact between Meir Berlin and Jacob Rosen-
heim regarding a meeting of the two movements, the Agudah executive came
together in Vienna. According to the protocols produced from this gathering
in January 1938, concerns about Palestine took center stage. In Vienna, Pol-
ish Agudah leader Isaac Meir Levin admitted that the movement had done
too little for the Jewish settlements in Palestine and urged his colleagues to
increase their efforts. “Providence (hashgoho),” he held, “literally chases us
with whiplashes to the Land of Israel. The Jewish People is in great dan-
ger. The only salvation,” he concluded, “is Agudat Yisrael.” Notwithstanding
this appeal, as soon as the debate turned to Mizrachi’s request for a meet-
ing, Levin expressed skepticism. When Rosenheim reported on his exchange
with Berlin, Levin immediately questioned the Mizrachi leader’s sincerity
and suggested that Agudah’s rival was not genuinely interested in cooper-
ation. Religious Zionists, in Levin’s view, merely wanted to draw political
profit from the negotiations.53
Levin’s accusations reflected heightened political tensions not only in
Poland and Palestine, but also in the United States. Agudah had been strug-
gling for years to gain a foothold in the growing Orthodox community over-
53Protokoll der Sitzung des Wa‘ad Ha-Poel der Agudas Jisrael in Wien vom 12.–16. Januar
1938 unter dem Vorsitz des Herrn Präsidenten Jacob Rosenheim, in Archives of Agudath
Yisrael of America (following: AAYA) BB47.
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seas. Mizrachists, who had already established themselves in American-
Jewish politics, attempted to thwart their plans. American Mizrachi conse-
quently published as a pamphlet a speech delivered by the rabbi of Kovno,
Abraham Dober Kahana-Shapira,54 at a local Mizrachi conference in the
early 1920s, showcasing his attempts to arbitrate between the two parties
in the immediate postwar years. Kahana-Shapira had highlighted the will-
ingness of Mizrachists to approach the other side and blamed Agudists for
blocking any such attempt. The pamphlet—entitled,“Who is guilty of the
schism between Mizrahi and Agudat Yisrael?—was apparently distributed
with the intention of maligning Agudah by accusing its leaders of stubbornly
rejecting any rapprochement between the two sides.55 Against this backdrop,
Levin suspected Berlin’s inquiry of serving similar purposes. Rabbi Aharon
Kotler, dean of the Yeshiva of Slutsk, also attended the Agudah conference in
Vienna and voiced suspicions similar to Levin’s concerning Mizrachi’s inten-
tions. In contrast to Levin, however, Kotler concluded that Agudah could not
dare reject Berlin’s offer to negotiate, as such a move would severely impact
the movement’s nascent branch in the United States.
Even Rosenheim himself, who generally advocated rapprochement, at
least vis-à-vis his Mizrachi counterparts, was pessimistic. All of the great
spiritual authorities, with the exception of Chaim Ozer Grodzenski, he main-
tained, objected to cooperation. In particular, the notably anti-Zionist El-
chonon Wassermann, head of the famous Novardok Yeshiva, had voiced
fierce resistance to the two organizations working together for the benefit of
educational institutions.56 In his conclusion, Rosenheim noted that if negoti-
ations were held, they should focus mainly on the question of a Jewish state,
and touch upon other issues only in passing. “But I do not believe,” Rosen-
heim concluded, “that they will lead to any tangible results.” According to
54Rabbi Abraham Dober Kahane-Shapira (1870–1943) was a widely acknowledged spiritual
authority. Born in the city of Kobryn, he became the chief rabbi of Kovno in 1923, and later
the last chief rabbi of Lithuania before World War II. The Lithuanian Rabbinate was known to
be a strong supporter of Mizrachi–Agudah rapprochement.
55Abraham Dober Kahane-Shapira, Ver iz shuldig in dem perud tsvishn Mizrahi un Agudat
Yisrael? (New York, 1938). The booklet’s very publication attests to the heightened signifi-
cance of Agudah in the US. In 1929, Mizrachi did not even bother to mention its opponent
in a similar pamphlet about the movement’s purpose and goals (in stark contrast to Mizrachi
propaganda literature from Europe during the same period that regularly highlighted the dif-
ferences between the two parties). See Yehuda Leib Maimon, Vos iz der Mizrahi? (New York,
1929).
56Grodzenski’s resistance to cooperation on behalf of the yeshivot was already known to both
Agudists and Mizrachists by this point. He had expressed his position clearly in a letter to
Meir Berlin, as one of the discussants at the Agudah convention pointed out. See Protokoll
der Sitzung des Wa‘ad Ha-Poel der Agudas Jisrael in Wien vom 12.-16. Januar 1938 unter
dem Vorsitz des Herrn Präsidenten Jacob Rosenheim, in AAYA BB47.
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the protocols of Agudah’s conference in Vienna, not a single voice came out
in clear favor of the negotiations.57 Much of the rationale behind the Agudah
decision to enter such negotiations, as the meeting in Vienna illustrates, was
influenced by considerations of the party’s public image.
Agudists were not the only ones worried about their reputation. While
Agudah leaders were concerned about appearing passive and resistant to rap-
prochement, their Mizrachi counterparts were anxious to be taken seriously
as political equals. This may explain why Berlin seemed surprisingly hesitant
in his initial correspondence with Levin and Rosenheim, especially consid-
ering that Mizrachists were the ones pushing for cooperation. Once Agudah
leaders had agreed to meet, Berlin turned down several suggested venues,
among them a proposition to meet in Vienna following a scheduled Agudah
assembly. A joint conference, Berlin insisted, should not be merely appended
to a convention of one of the parties. Both sides, he demanded, should prove
their sincerity by putting in extra effort to meet.58 Berlin’s sensitivity on this
issue demonstrates the extent to which Mizrachists were anxious not to ap-
pear to be currying favor with Agudah. Similarly, when the latter’s Council
of Torah Sages subsequently delayed the ratification of the Paris agreements,
some Mizrachists concluded that they had done their bit and should resist
any further negotiations because “the Jewish world would consider this to be
a flattery of Agudah.”59
At the same time, Mizrachists attempted to take advantage of Agudist
concerns about their own public image. When, in May 1938, Rosenheim in-
formed Zalman Shragai that he doubted whether Agudah’s rabbinic council
would ratify the agreement, the latter asked the Mizrachi executive to seize
the moment. “I have the feeling that they want to duck out of the coopera-
tion,” Shragai wrote to Berlin, “but there is a lot of pressure from the masses
and I think that we should raise this pressure by publishing articles in the
press and by postulating the unity of religious Jewry.”60 Shragai’s comments
shed light on the response of Mizrachi media to the Paris accords, more gen-
erally. As noted above, the Mizrachi media were quick to publish reports
57Leaders from Palestine shortly thereafter voiced similar suspicions. In April 1938, the
Jerusalem office complained about Mizrachists distorting the facts concerning the Paris agree-
ment in their party propaganda. See a letter from the office of Agudat Yisrael in Jerusalem to
Jacob Rosenheim, April 24, 1938 in Archives of Agudat Yisrael in Palestine, Jerusalem, 122.
58Berlin also turned down a proposal to meet in Warsaw. See Din ve-Heshbon ha-Merkaz
ha-’Olami shel ha-Mizrahi le-Ve‘idah ha-Olamit ha-15’ be-Genevah, 6.8.-13.8.1939, 63f in
ARRZ 006–36.
59Elimelech Neufeld to Meir Berlin, May 31, 1938, in ARZ MO140.
60Jacob Rosenheim to Zalman Shragai, May 2, 1938; Zalman Shragai to Meir Berlin, May
18, 1938, in ibid., MO143.
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of the Paris accords, hailing the agreements as a great victory for Ortho-
dox Jewry in general, and for their party in particular. Just one day after
the Mizrachi presidium ratified the Paris agreement, the Mizrachi newspa-
per from Palestine, Ha-Tsofeh, reported the news on its front page.61 Such
coverage increased pressure on Agudah by raising hopes among the Jewish
masses, who were already inclined to favor cooperation between the parties.
What is more, they signaled to readers that religious Zionists—as compared
with their traditionalist counterparts—were making every effort to improve
the grave situation of religious Jews.62
The London Agreements and the Collapse of the Negotiations
Although Mizrachists had pushed for ratification of the Paris agreements,
they were far less enthusiastic about the London accords. With some Agudah
leaders pressing for implementation and Mizrachists navigating hesitantly,
their roles now seemed almost reversed. In this respect, the London agree-
ments can serve to illustrate the fact that, rather than altruistically working to
overcome the schism in Jewish Orthodoxy, both sides carefully weighed the
chances and risks of their political cooperation.
As mentioned previously, Berlin ultimately signed the London accords
despite his colleagues’ resistance. Much political maneuvering followed, but
after all the back and forth it seemed that their efforts to mobilize local chap-
ters would finally bear fruit, at least in England. In their joint fundraising
endeavors there, two treasurers were to be appointed, one for each side. En-
glish Mizrachists nominated their treasurer but did not consent to Agudah’s
choice. In the resulting letter exchange with Berlin, Rosenheim tried to foster
a compromise that would allow the two sides to move forward with the joint
campaign. Since the English Mizrachi was not willing to accept Agudah’s
choice, he suggested nominating one treasurer instead of two, someone inde-
pendent and impartial, unaffiliated with either party.63 The English Mizrachi,
however, insisted that Agudat Yisrael must nominate an alternate candidate
and referred to a “gentleman’s agreement,” that Berlin and Rosenheim had
61Ha-Z. ofeh, April 21, 1938, 1.
62Agudists too were concerned about strengthening support for their movement. Yet, at the
same time, they were wary of modern mass politics. Moreover, comments in the press were
bound to ignite criticism from conservative circles and raise the suspicions of the spiritual
leadership against any cooperation with the Zionists. In the Old Yishuv, indeed, the news of
an agreement with Mizrachi sparked fierce disapproval and discussion. See Agudat Yisrael
in Jerusalem to Jacob Rosenheim April 24, 1938, in Archives of Agudat Yisrael in Palestine,
Jerusalem 122.
63Jacob Rosenheim to Mizrachi Federation, March 24, 1939 in ARZ MO112-24.
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allegedly made about this. When Rosenheim contacted Berlin, he expressed
suspicion that English Mizrachists were not actually interested in implement-
ing the London accords. Berlin dismissed this and reproached his correspon-
dent for not keeping to their agreement. Returning the blame, he complained
that Agudah, once again, was doing everything to frustrate mutual efforts at
cooperation, and he accused the Swiss, Belgian, and Dutch Agudah chapters
of violating the accords. This, as Rosenheim rightly pointed out in his answer,
was not factually correct, as the agreement explicitly stated that each national
chapter would agree separately to conduct joint fundraising campaigns.64
Berlin, without doubt, knew this. What, then, motivated his uncompromis-
ing stance? Among Mizrachi leaders, the London accords had been highly
unpopular from the time Moses Blau first raised the idea. Only a small mi-
nority saw in these agreements an actual opportunity to bring the two sides
closer together. Most Mizrachists decried their limited dimension and sus-
pected that Agudists were merely seeking economic gain. Religious Zionists
were well aware of the critical role that fundraising played in the success
of a political movement. Just one year earlier, in January 1938, they them-
selves had made concerted efforts to professionalize their own fundraising in
Poland and set up a board devoted exclusively to dealing with such matters.
Mizrachi leader Elimelech Neufeld had come to Poland from Palestine to
advertise these efforts, and recruit activists and rabbis for practical help and
support. Zeev Gold, in a communication with the Polish leader Isaac Nis-
senbaum about these efforts, stressed the immense importance of Mizrachi’s
Palestine fund, Keren Erez. Yisrael, and called on his Polish colleagues to turn
the Jewish festival of Shavuot (Feast of Weeks) into a fixed date for raising
money specifically for this fund. The festival during which Jews celebrated
God’s giving of the Torah to Israel, he pointed out, was the ideal occasion for
such activities. Shavuot was the only holiday, he added, on which the Jewish
National Fund did “not yet have a monopoly.” The ZO, he stressed, owed
its strength to its successful fundraising.65 In such matters, Mizrachists had
a clear advantage over their Agudist opponents due to their tighter organi-
zation, their unequivocal embrace of social and political activism, and their
affiliation with the Zionist movement.
In the early winter of 1939, Meir Berlin was in regular contact with
the Polish Mizrachi leader Simha Bunam Feldman. Reporting to Berlin on
the situation in Poland, Feldman painted a depressing picture of the local
branch, excoriating virtually every one of the eminent local Mizrachi lead-
ers. But even in this bleakest of assessments, Mizrachi still fared far better
than its non-Zionist counterpart. Feldman interpreted Blau’s suggestion for
64Summary of Correspondence and Relevant Documents, in ibid., MO155.
65Zeev Gold to Isaac Nissenbaum, January 2, 1938, in ibid., MO147.
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joint fundraising as a sign of Agudah’s weakness. Yitzhak Breuer’s efforts to
collect money for the Keren Ha-Yishuv had been unsuccessful. Blau’s sug-
gestion, Feldman believed, was simply an attempt to improve the situation of
Agudah, to learn from Mizrachists, and to gain from their connections and
networks.66 Religious Zionists should not allow this to happen, he asserted,
as a joint campaign would also expose Mizrachi’s shortcomings to Agudists.
“Why,” Feldman concluded, “would we reveal to them that we, too, have an
Achilles’ heel?”67
Throughout the spring of 1939, opposition within Mizrachi to an agree-
ment on joint fundraising efforts continued to mount. In particular,
Mizrachists from Switzerland and England expressed their opposition to
such frameworks, confirming Rosenheim’s suspicions. A few days before
Berlin cancelled the deal, he received an angry letter from Zurich, in which
Swiss Mizrachi leaders expressed their complete rejection of any coopera-
tion with the local Agudah branch and dismissed out of hand any positive
aspects of the agreement. “We cannot conceal,” the enraged Swiss leaders
concluded, “that this affair has shaken our confidence in the Mizrachi execu-
tive.”68 British leaders made similarly disparaging comments regarding local
cooperation. Their branch, they reported to Berlin, had already begun col-
lecting funds for the Palestine endeavors of their movement, and they were
not willing to share this money with a political opponent. “Actually,” they
told Berlin forthrightly, “at the meeting [we held last April] every member
was in favour of seeking a method by which we could conveniently get out of
the agreement.”69 They found their “convenient method” in the quarrel over
the appointment of an Agudah treasurer. Nevertheless, in August 1939, in its
official report on the negotiations, Mizrachi singled out their political oppo-
nents as solely responsible for the agreement’s failure. “We thus see that not
even Agudah’s rabbinic council decides, but John Doe. We have made every
effort—and maybe even more—in order to reach unity. If this, to our deepest
regret, did not materialize, the blame is definitely not on our side.”70
66In this context it is worth pointing out that personal motives might also have guided Moses
Blau. He was a bitter rival of Isaac Breuer and may have seen the fundraiser as opportunity
to challenge Breuer’s authority. This led to bitter conflict between the two men, which could
only be settled through strong pressure from their party colleagues. See Protokoll der Sitzung
des Wa‘ad Ha-Poel der Agudas Jisrael, in AAYA BB47.
67Simha Feldman to Meir Berlin, January 30 to March 1, 1939, in ibid., MO151.
68Mizrachi Swiss to Mizrachi Executive Jerusalem, May 26, 1939, Betzalel Bidziński to
Mizrachi Swiss, June 13, 1939, in ibid., MO161.
69W. Frankel, secretary of British Mizrachi to Berlin, April 25, 1939, in ibid., MO160.
70Din ve-Heshbon ha-Merkaz ha-’Olami shel ha-Mizrah. i le-Ve‘idah ha-’Olamit ha-15’ be-
Genevah, 6.8.–13.8.1939, 80 in ARRZ 006–36. For an account of the agreements from the
Agudist point of view, harshly blaming Mizrachists for their failure, see Kol Yisrael, August
10, 1939, 5f; August 16, 1939, 2, 4.
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Conclusions: The Historic Significance of the Two Agreements
Less than a month after the Mizrachi executive published its final evaluation
of their negotiations with the Agudah leadership, the German Wehrmacht in-
vaded Poland. Following the ensuing destruction of European Jewry in the
Holocaust, Palestine and the U.S. emerged as the two most important centers
of Jewish life and politics. Against this backdrop, it is questionable whether
the Paris and London agreements would have been implemented even if they
had been ratified. Nevertheless, these failed negotiations offer historians an
important window into relations between the two largest and most influen-
tial Orthodox movements on the eve of World War II. As this article demon-
strates, both sides had their own specific reasons for participating in the talks.
Overall, the religious Zionists displayed a greater willingness to cooperate
during these years. Yet, as I have argued throughout, Mizrachi’s enthusiasm
over the Paris accords and the reluctant responses of the Agudists should not
lead us to conclude that this is simply another example of Zionist activism
versus the alleged passivity of non-Zionist Orthodoxy. Mizrachi’s report on
the negotiations, which is the main available source for this historic meeting,
demonstrates that this narrative played a role in the unfolding of the event
itself and dominated Mizrachi discourse in its aftermath, which is reason in
itself to treat it with particular caution. A more measured historical approach
will carefully analyze the approaches and interactions of the two movements
in light of their distinct political interests and concerns. It is critical to keep
in mind that Mizrachists and Agudists were not solely driven by ideology
but were locked in competition for power and leadership within the camp
of traditionalist Jewry. These leaders’ attempts to cooperate and the public
coverage of such endeavors were part and parcel of their political rivalry.
In addition to sincere concern over the fate of Orthodox Jewry, both par-
ties worried about their reputation among the Jewish masses. In light of the
grave geopolitical situation, neither wanted to appear closed-minded or un-
willing to compromise. These apprehensions helped bring Mizrachists and
Agudists to the negotiating table in the first place. Over time, however, the
ongoing concern of each side about maintaining its public image increasingly
impeded negotiations. At first, religious Zionists pushed more adamantly for
an agreement. The final ratification of the Paris accords would have been a
major success for their movement, affording them at least symbolic recog-
nition by some of the most widely accepted spiritual authorities of the day.
The value of such recognition is hard to overestimate. Indeed, when it came
to the London accords, even staunch opponents of cooperation with Agudah
expressed willingness to drop their objection if it granted Mizrachi’s work
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“rabbinic certification” (hekhsher).71 But the London treaty had a limited fo-
cus and was confined to Western Europe, and, in actuality, the accords would
not have awarded Mizrachi such a hekhsher. Consequently, most Mizrachists
concluded that the price they would have to pay in this round was too high
and not worthwhile. Since they did not want to appear to be backing out,
however, they needed an excuse for dismantling the arrangement. Agudists,
on the other hand, were, from the outset, reluctant to work with their op-
ponents on sensitive religious issues, concerned that such cooperation could
be read as recognition of Zionist activism and Mizrachi. The London agree-
ment, which limited cooperation to a joint fundraising campaign, would have
allowed Agudah to reap significant benefits without paying a meaningful po-
litical price, and therefore enjoyed broader support among the party lead-
ership. In many ways, these reactions reflected the power relationship be-
tween the two movements. Agudah was in a much stronger position when it
came to the support of the traditionalist milieu. However, due to their ambiva-
lence toward social and political activism and their reluctance to engage in
modern mass politics, they lacked funding and political partnership. Here,
Mizrachists had the advantage. This is what Feldman had in mind when
raising suspicions about Agudah gaining important insights and networks
through joint fundraising.
Local dynamics played a significant role during negotiations as well. This
became blatantly obvious during the implementation of the London agree-
ments, when individual national chapters resisted cooperation. Agudah, in
particular, was riven by power struggles between different regional centers,72
but such conflicts plagued religious Zionism as well, as became clear when
Polish Mizrachists protested elements of the Paris agreements that they took
to be an intrusion into their internal affairs. Local sensitivities had, in fact,
already been raised as a concern by participants in the meeting at the Ambas-
sador Hotel. While all attendees emphasized the importance of cooperation
for the improvement of religious life and institutions in Palestine and world-
wide, just where and how such cooperation could be reached had been a
highly contentious issue. Some representatives were convinced that the two
movements had to start their common efforts in Palestine. Cooperation there,
they hoped, would lead to changes in the attitudes of Diaspora leaders as
well, and demonstrate the benefits of such endeavors. Others held the op-
posite to be the case. Only after the countries in the Diaspora set a good
example, they claimed, would Jewish leaders in Palestine follow suit.73 The
71See Simcha Feldman’s exchange of letters with Meir Berlin, as cited above, Simha Feldman
to Meir Berlin January 30, 1939, in ARZ MO151.
72For a detailed description of these struggles, see Fund, Perud o Hishtatfut.
73Protokol mi-ha-Yeshivah ha-Meshutefet bein ha-Agudah ve-ha-Mizrahi be-Yom 4.4.1938
be-Malon Ambasador be-Paris, in ibid., 001-495.
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dividing lines in these debates ran across both camps. Many of those in-
volved expressed general support for cooperation but seemed reluctant when
it came to implementation in their own national chapters. Such hesitations
were well-founded, as the quarrels over joint fundraising endeavors eventu-
ally made clear. The complaints of the local Swiss and British chapters were
what sabotaged the London accords only one year later.
The fact that the negotiations in Paris and London, and subsequent de-
bates over the ratification of these agreements were shaped largely by power
struggles and political dynamics does not mean that religious and ideological
issues played no role. British partition plans, however, confronted Orthodox
leaders from across the spectrum with the challenge of safeguarding religious
life and institutions in a future state, creating an urgent, common agenda.
While ideologically Mizrachists promoted the idea of Jewish statehood, they,
like their non-Zionist counterparts, also feared secular domination. As a re-
sult, both sides were willing to work together in this area. Indeed, the St.
James Conference on the partition of Palestine, held in February 1939, may
have been one of the incentives for Mizrachi and Agudah to renew their at-
tempts at cooperation within the framework of the London accords. But any
steps beyond this very limited cooperation were highly contentious. When
the British failed to foster a compromise between Arabs and Zionists, Ortho-
dox leaders became less inclined to cooperate and this may at least partially
explain their eventual abandonment of the agreements.74
From a contemporary perspective, it is difficult to understand how Ortho-
dox leaders got so caught up in seemingly petty political calculations and
tactical maneuvering on the eve of the Nazi inferno. While the historical
actors could not have known the full implications of the threat facing Eu-
ropean Jewry, they were well attuned to the dire social and political situa-
tion of traditionalist Jewry at the time. The fact that Orthodox leaders were
not willing to work together even under these circumstances attests to the
depth of the rift between them. Even the drastic and far-reaching geopolitical
shifts of these years did not lead to ideological rapprochement between the
movements. The essential cultural and religious issues that divided the two
groups only intensified and deepened the rifts between them. Beyond their
distinct political approaches, the visions of Orthodox society that Agudists
and Mizrachists advanced looked increasingly different. The social and cul-
tural institutions that each movement sponsored or supported shaped the lives
of Orthodox Jews well beyond the realm of politics, fostering ever more sig-
nificant socio-cultural separation, and generating two separate and distinct
74For such a line of argument, see Nathaniel Katzburg, in his introduction to Meir Berlin’s
autobiography: Meir Bar-Ilan: Me-Volozhin ad Yerushalayim, vol. 1 (Tel Aviv, 1971), 46.
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milieus that would emerge more fully during the early years of Israeli state-
hood: Ultra-Orthodoxy and national-religious Judaism.75
It is precisely from this perspective that the negotiations in Paris and Lon-
don constitute an important stage in the relations of the two movements.
Much as some participants feared, negotiations between Mizrachi and Agu-
dah leaders expressed the mutual, if indirect, acknowledgment that both par-
ties legitimately represented segments of Orthodox Jewry. While the sub-
stantial differences between the movements were clear to those involved, the
negotiations also highlighted issues and concerns common to both camps,
thereby laying the foundations for subsequent negotiations and cooperation.
Indeed, mutual recognition and the clear demarcation of the two camps ul-
timately allowed Agudah and Mizrachi leaders to engage in a significant if
short-lived formal cooperation one decade later. In November 1948, repre-
sentatives of all Orthodox parties in the nascent Israeli government formed
the “United Religious Front,” a temporary electoral alliance that worked to
establish and secure religious institutions and frameworks in the recently
founded Jewish state. While the electoral alliance itself disintegrated after
only a few years, the frameworks that it helped institute deeply influenced
Israeli society and state over the following decades and beyond.
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